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Abstract
In this article some difficulties are deduced from the set of natural numbers.
By using the method of transfinite recursion we define an iterative process which
is designed to deduct all the non-greatest elements of the set of natural numbers.
But unexpectedly we meet some difficulties in answering the question of whether
the iterative process can deduct all the elements of the set of natural numbers. The
demonstrated difficulties suggest that if we regard the class of natural numbers as
a set we will be confronted with either a contradiction or a conflict with the axiom
of regularity. As a result, we have the conclusion that the class of natural numbers
is not a set but a proper class.
Introduction
That all the natural numbers can be pooled together to form an infinite set is a fun-
damental hypothesis in mathematics and philosophy, which now is widely accepted by
mathematicians and scientists from various disciplines. With this hypothesis mathemati-
cians had systematically developed a theory of infinity, namely, set theory which had
become the foundation of modern mathematics and science ever since. Although once
this hypothesis was a controversial issue between different schools of mathematics and
philosophy and some intuitionists object to it on the grounds that a collection of objects
produced by an infinite process should not be treated as a completed entity [1], they
do not provide further evidence to prove that it will cause logical contradiction. And no
contradiction resulting from this hypothesis had ever been reported. Today the debate
has subsided and most scientists do not doubt about the validity of this hypothesis. How-
ever, in our recent study we have found some logical contradictions resulting from this
hypothesis, which suggest if the axiom of infinity holds it either leads to a contradiction
or a conflict with the axiom of regularity. So set theory is not as consistent as we had
thought before. We anticipate our study to be a starting point for the establishment of
a more sophisticated foundation theory to prevent mathematics and thus other sciences
from contradiction.
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1 The definition of natural numbers in set theory
In order to define natural numbers and study the set of natural numbers within the
framework of set theory it is necessary to define a successor relation first [1].
Definition 1.1. The successor of a set x is the set x+ = x ∪ {x}.
The notation ‘+’ in above definition represents the successor operator which can be
applied to any set to obtain its successor.
In set theory the first natural number 0 is defined with the empty set φ, then number
1 with the successor of 0 and so on. To make the expression more intuitively we usually
use the more suggestive notation n+1 for n+ when n is a number. So we have following
inductive definition of natural numbers [1]
Definition 1.2. The definition of natural numbers
1. 0 = φ is a natural number.
2. If n is a natural number, its successor n+ 1 is also a natural number.
3. All natural numbers are obtained by application of 1 and 2.
The first rule of above definition is the basis of the induction which defines the initial
natural number 0, and the second rule is the inductive step which can be repeatedly
applied to obtain other natural numbers. The third rule is the restriction clause. So we
can assign each natural number a certain value of a particular set
0 = φ, 1 = φ+, 2 = φ++, · · ·
Whether all the natural numbers can be pooled together to form a completed infinite
entity i.e. a set is a critical issue in mathematics and philosophy. Around it two opposite
concepts of infinity have been developed, which are potential infinity and actual infinity.
The former regards the infinite series 0, 1, 2, ... is potentially endless and the process of
adding more and more numbers cannot be exhausted in principle, so it never can make a
definite entity. The latter is based one the hypothesis that all natural numbers can form
an actual, completed totality, namely, a set. That means the static set has already been
completed and contained all natural numbers. Set theory is based on the notion of actual
infinity that is clearly manifested in the axiom of infinity which postulates the existence
of an inductive set and thus guarantees the existence of the set of natural numbers.
2 Difficulties of the set of natural numbers
In set theory the axiom of infinity which postulates the existence of an inductive set
guarantees the existence of the set of natural numbers.
The Axiom of Infinity. An inductive set exists [1].
Because N, the set of natural numbers, is the smallest inductive set, it is easy to prove
its existence based on the axiom of infinity. Let C be an existing inductive set; then we
justify the existence of N on the basis of the axiom of comprehension [1]
N = {x ∈ C|x ∈ I for every inductive set I}.
That implies if C exists then N exists.
Usually set N can be expressed as an infinite list of natural numbers such as
(2.1) N = {0, 1, 2, · · · }.
or briefly as
(2.2) N = {x|n(x)}.
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where n(x) is the predicate that x is a natural number. However, this form of expression
obviously uses the comprehension principle, which is thought to be the source of para-
doxes in Cantor’s naive set theory. Whether the using of comprehension principle here
will result in contradiction is an interesting issue to us. And it is indeed the case, for we
have found sufficient evidence to prove that the notion of the set of natural numbers is
illogical and will lead to logical contradiction. Here we show our findings of a sequence
of conflicts based on the question whether there is the greatest element in set N. First
let’s consider a special collection S of all x ∈ N with the property P (x)
(2.3) S = {x ∈ N|P (x)}.
where the property P (x) is ∀y ∈ N(x ≥ y) which means x is greater than or equal to all the
elements of N. Here the relation x ≥ y can be interpreted as the set relation y ∈ x∨y = x
when x and y are ordinal numbers. According to the axiom schema of comprehension [1],
if N is a set, S is a definite set. Obviously, if S is an empty set the greatest element of N
does not exist; if S is not an empty set it must contain the greatest element of N and thus
the greatest element of N does exist. According to the law of excluded middle, for all x
of N, x either has or does not have the property P (x), so intuitively we have following
method to obtain set S. That is we can deduct all N’s elements without the property P
from N and the remaining part should be S. To do this we need to define an iterative
process with transfinite recursion to recursively deduct all non-greatest elements of N. As
transfinite recursion can go into transfinite steps, it has the ability to deduct infinitely
many non-greatest elements. Therefore it is feasible to use transfinite recursion to deduct
all non-greatest elements and obtain the particular remaining part. The iterative process
can be implemented in this way. Choose two elements out of N, remove the smaller one
that clearly does not have the property P and return the bigger one to the remaining
part. Repeat this procedure until there are no two elements left in the remaining part
that can be further chosen to implement further deduction and this particular remaining
part should be S. So whether the iterative process can deduct all the elements of N is a
critical question. If it can the remaining part is empty, so the the greatest element does
not exist; if it cannot the remaining part is not empty, so the greatest element maybe
exists. To clarify the fact we make in-depth investigation by translating the question into
a well-defined mathematical representation. First let’s define a Min function applied to
two natural numbers to obtain the smaller one
Min(x, y) =
{
x if x ≤ y
y if y < x
In set theory, it is obvious that the Min(x, y) function can be implemented as the inter-
section of natural numbers x and y
(2.4) Min(x, y) = x ∩ y.
Then according to the axiom of choice [1], there is a choice function f , defined on set
X = P (N)\{φ} (where P (N) is the power set of N, and P (N)\{φ} represents the set-
theoretic difference of P (N) and {φ}), such that
∀x(x ∈ X → f(x) ∈ x)
where symbol→ symbolizes the the relation of material implication. So we have following
inductive definition.
Definition 2.1. For all ordinals α ∈ On, recursively define following transfinite se-
quences Aα, Bα and aα.
1. Aα = {aβ|β < α}.
2. Bα = N\Aα.
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3. aα =


Min(f(Bα), f(Bα\{f(Bα)})) if Card(Bα) > 1
b if Card(Bα) = 1
c if Card(Bα) = 0
.
Where ordinal number α indicates a particular recursion step, Aα is the set of all
the elements that have already been deducted from N before step α is performed, Bα is
the particular remaining part of N exactly before step α is performed (Bα also can be
understood as the particular remaining part of N exactly after all steps before step α
have been performed), aα is the particular element of N that is deducted at the current
step α if Bα still contains more than one element otherwise it equals b or c, Card(Bα)
stands for the cardinality of set Bα, b = {2} and c = {2, 3} are sets not belong to N.
It is easy to obtain every elements of the transfinite sequences Aα, Bα and aα with
definition 2.1. First it is obvious that A0 = φ (before step 0 is performed nothing is
deducted), B0 = N (before step 0 is performed the remaining part is exact N) and
a0 = Min(f(N), f(N\{f(N)})). Second if we have obtained all aβ for β < α, then we
can obtain Aα, Bα and aα with the three clauses of definition 2.1 respectively. So, in line
with the principle of transfinite recursion, the transfinite sequences Aα, Bα and aα exist.
It is obvious that we can determine whether the iterative process can deduct all the
elements of N by the value of sequence Bα. If and only if fore every ordinal step α we have
Bα 6= φ, then the iterative process cannot deduct all the elements of N. So the necessary
and sufficient condition for the iterative process cannot deduct all the elements of N is
∀α(Bα 6= φ). As a result, we have following definitions.
Definition 2.2. We say the iterative process cannot deduct all the elements of N by
step α if and only if Bα+1 6= φ (the remaining part is still not empty after step α is
performed).
And then we have definition 2.3.
Definition 2.3. We say the the iterative process cannot deduct all the elements of N
if and only if the iterative process cannot deduct all the elements of N by every ordinal
step, which can be written as the formula ∀α(Bα+1 6= φ).
Considering ∀α(Bα 6= φ) =⇒ ∀α(Bα+1 6= φ) and ∀α(Bα+1 6= φ) =⇒ ∀α(Bα 6=
φ) (observe Bα+1 ⊆ Bα, the first property of lemma 2.4), definition 2.3 is obviously
reasonable. Based on above terminologies, the expression that the iterative process cannot
deduct all the elements of N before step β, which restricts its concerning domain to the
steps before step β while the statement made in 2.3 is about the whole domain of all
ordinal steps (in other words, the statement in 2.3 refers to the iterative process cannot
deduct all the elements in the whole domain of all ordinal steps while the above expression
refers to the iterative process cannot only in the restricted domain of all steps before β),
should be logically interpreted as the iterative process cannot deduct all the elements of
N by every step before step β or formally as ∀α(α < β → Bα+1 6= φ).
With above definitions and interpretations we expect to answer the question whether
the iterative process can deduct all the elements of N. But in the following study we
meet some difficulties in answering the question. If the answer is yes we will encounter
a contradiction; if the answer is no the greatest natural number must exist and will lead
to a conflict with the axiom of regularity, another contradiction. The following sections
show the dilemma of how to answer the question.
According to the clause 3 of definition 2.1, the recursion steps can be classified into
three classes corresponding to the three conditions Card(Bα) > 1, Card(Bα) = 1 and
Card(Bα) = 0. And it is easy to see that only if the step α satisfies the first condition
Card(Bα) > 1 does the iterative process deduct one element from N at step α; otherwise
it deducts nothing from N at step α. The second and third conditions are end condi-
tions which mean once the recursion step has meets these conditions the deduction of
elements ends and the remaining part keep invariant after that step. The third condition
Card(Bα) = 0 is the empty end condition which implies the iterative process can deduct
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all the elements of N; the second condition Card(Bα) = 1 is the non-empty end condition
which implies the iterative process cannot deduct all the elements of N. Then we have
lemma 2.4.
Lemma 2.4. The transfinite sequences have following properties.
1. β ≤ α→ Aβ ⊆ Aα ∧Bα ⊆ Bβ.
2. α 6= β ∧ Card(Bα) > 1 ∧ Card(Bβ > 1)→ Bα 6= Bβ.
3. ∃γ(Card(Bγ) = 1).
Proof. 1. Notice β ≤ α and Aα’s definition. Then for any x, we have
x ∈ Aβ =⇒ ∃γ(aγ = x ∧ γ < β) =⇒ ∃γ(aγ = x ∧ γ < α) =⇒ x ∈ Aα
where symbol =⇒ symbolizes the relation of logical consequence. So we have
Aβ ⊆ Aα
and
Aβ ⊆ Aα =⇒ ∀x(x /∈ Aα → x /∈ Aβ)
=⇒ ∀x(x ∈ N ∧ x /∈ Aα → x ∈ N ∧ x /∈ Aβ)
=⇒ ∀x(x ∈ N\Aα → x ∈ N\Aβ)
=⇒ ∀x(x ∈ Bα → x ∈ Bβ)
=⇒ Bα ⊆ Bβ
So we obtain property 1.
2. If α 6= β, then either α < β or β < α. Let α < β. Then
Card(Bα) > 1 =⇒ aα = Min(f(Bα), f(Bα\{f(Bα)})) =⇒ aα ∈ Bα
Then noticing Aα’s definition and α < β =⇒ α + 1 ≤ β =⇒ Bβ ⊆ Bα+1, we
have
aα ∈ Aα+1 =⇒ aα /∈ N\Aα+1 =⇒ aα /∈ Bα+1 =⇒ aα /∈ Bβ
So considering above two cases: aα ∈ Bα and aα /∈ Bβ , we obtain
Bα 6= Bβ
For the same reason it is easy to prove if β < α then Bβ 6= Bα, so we have property
2 which indicates all Bα in the transfinite sequence are non-repeating when they
satisfy Card(Bα) > 1.
3. Let B = {Bα|Card(Bα) > 1}, so all the members of B are subsets of N. Therefore
B is a subset of P (N) that implies B is a set.
Then let A = {α|Card(Bα) > 1}. From property 2 of lemma 2.4 we know all Bα
in the sequence are non-repeating when they satisfy Card(Bα) > 1, so there is a
one-to-one correspondence, F : A ↔ B (ordinal α corresponds to Bα), between A
and B. So A is a set also, or precisely it is a set of some ordinals. Then for any
ordinal numbers α and β, we have following logical derivation
α ∈ A ∧ β < α =⇒ Card(Bα) > 1 ∧Bα ⊆ Bβ =⇒ Card(Bβ) > 1 =⇒ β ∈ A
As a result, we obtain
∀α∀β(β < α ∧ α ∈ A→ β ∈ A)
That indicates set A is an initial segment of ordinal, so there is an ordinal number
λ equals A
A = λ = {α|α < λ}
Observing the axiom of regularity, we have λ /∈ λ and thus λ /∈ A. That implies
ordinal number λ must not satisfy set A’s condition, so Card(Bλ) 6> 1. There-
fore there are only two cases, i.e., Card(Bλ) = 0 or Card(Bλ) = 1. The first
case Card(Bλ) = 0, which means the recursion meets the empty end condition,
implies the iterative process can deduct all the elements of N. The second case
Card(Bλ) = 1, which means the recursion meets the non-empty end condition, im-
plies the iterative process cannot deduct all the elements of N. Let Card(Bλ) = 0.
Then
Bλ = φ
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As a result, we have
Bλ+1 = φ
So after step λ is performed the iterative process has already deducted all the ele-
ments of N. Observe Card(Bλ) = 0; we know the iterative process deducts nothing
from N at step λ. So, before step λ is performed the iterative process has already
deducted all the elements of N also. Therefore the iterative process can deduct all
the elements of N before step λ.
On the other hand, notice that all the ordinal numbers α less than λ are λ’s mem-
bers; then for any ordinal α we have
α < λ =⇒ α ∈ λ =⇒ α ∈ A =⇒ Card(Bα) > 1 =⇒ Card(Bα\{aα}) > 0 =⇒
Card(Bα+1) > 0 =⇒ Bα+1 6= φ
So we obtain
∀α(α < λ→ Bα+1 6= φ)
that indicates by every step before λ the iterative process cannot deduct all the
elements of N. So the iterative process cannot deduct all the elements of N before
step λ that contradicts the previous conclusion. As a result, to prevent this obvious
contradiction, the assumption Card(Bλ) = 0 must be invalid, so Card(Bλ) = 1. So
we have obtained a particular ordinal number λ satisfies Card(Bλ) = 1.Therefore
we obtain property 3.
Notice that every non-empty subset x of N has its least element. Let the choice
function f(x) choose the least element of x. So that
(2.5) f(x) = ∩x.
and the equation in the clause 3 of definition 2.1 becomes
(2.6) aα =


∩Bα if Card(Bα) > 1
b if Card(Bα) = 1
c if Card(Bα) = 0
.
Proof. If Card(Bα) > 1, then
aα = Min(f(Bα), f(Bα\{f(Bα)}))
Observe Eq. (2.4) and (2.5). Then we have
aα = f(Bα) ∩ f(Bα\{f(Bα)})
= (∩Bα) ∩ (∩(Bα\{f(Bα)}))
= (∩Bα) ∩ (∩(Bα\{∩(Bα)}))
= ∩Bα
So we obtain Eq. (2.6). From it we know only under condition Card(Bα) > 1 does the
recursion step generate aα belongs to N, so if aα belongs to N it must be generated by
the first case of Eq. (2.6). Therefore we have
(2.7) aα ∈ N→ aα = ∩Bα.
And the transfinite sequences have the additional property
(2.8) ∀x(x ∈ Aα ∩ N ∧Bα 6= φ→ x ≤ ∩Bα).
Proof. Let Bα 6= φ and β < α, then from property 1 of lemma we know both Bα and Bβ
are non-empty sets of natural numbers and Bα ⊆ Bβ . So
∩Bβ ≤ ∩Bα
Above derivation can be expressed as formula (2.9) to facilitate following derivation
(2.9) Bα 6= φ ∧ β < α→ ∩Bβ ≤ ∩Bα.
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Observe formula (2.7) and (2.9). Then for any x, we have
x ∈ Aα ∩ N ∧Bα 6= φ
=⇒ x ∈ Aα ∧ x ∈ N ∧Bα 6= φ
=⇒ ∃β(β < α ∧ aβ = x) ∧ x ∈ N ∧Bα 6= φ
=⇒ ∃β(β < α ∧ aβ = x ∧ x ∈ N ∧Bα 6= φ)
=⇒ ∃β(β < α ∧ aβ = x ∧ aβ ∈ N ∧Bα 6= φ)
=⇒ ∃β(β < α ∧ aβ = x ∧ aβ = ∩Bβ ∧Bα 6= φ)
=⇒ ∃β(aβ = x ∧ aβ = ∩Bβ ∧Bα 6= φ ∧ β < α)
=⇒ ∃β(aβ = x ∧ aβ = ∩Bβ ∧ ∩Bβ ≤ ∩Bα)
=⇒ ∃β(aβ = x ∧ aβ ≤ ∩Bα)
=⇒ x ≤ ∩Bα
Therefore, we obtain formula 2.8.
As a result we have theorem 2.5.
Theorem 2.5. The greatest element of N exists.
Proof. From the property 3 of lemma 2.4 we know there is an ordinal number γ such
that Bγ contains only one element z
Bγ = {z}
Considering definition 2.1, we have
Bγ = N\Aγ =⇒ Bγ ⊆ N =⇒ z ∈ N
and
Bγ = Bγ ∩ N = N\(Aγ ∩ N)→ Bγ ∪ (Aγ ∩ N) = N
Notice Bγ = {z} 6= φ and formula 2.8. Then we have
∀x(x ∈ Aγ ∩ N ∧Bγ 6= φ→ x ≤ ∩Bγ)
=⇒ ∀x(x ∈ Aγ ∩ N→ x ≤ z)
=⇒ ∀x(x ∈ Aγ ∩ N→ x ≤ z) ∧ ∀x(x ∈ Bγ → x ≤ z)
=⇒ ∀x(x ∈ Aγ ∩ N ∨ x ∈ Bγ → x ≤ z)
=⇒ ∀x(x ∈ (Aγ ∩ N) ∪Bγ → x ≤ z)
=⇒ ∀x(x ∈ N→ x ≤ z)
So z is greater than or equal to all the elements of N. Noticing z ∈ N, z is the greatest
element of N. Therefore, the set S defined in Eq. (2.3) is not an empty set and equals
{z}.
Then we obtain theorem 2.6.
Theorem 2.6. N is an element of itself.
Proof. From the definition of N we know
x ∈ N =⇒ x+ ∈ N ∧ x ∈ x+ =⇒ x ∈ ∪N
so
∀x(x ∈ N→ x ∈ ∪N)
therefore
N ⊆ ∪N
As set N is transitive [1], we also have
x ∈ ∪N =⇒ ∃y(y ∈ N ∧ x ∈ y) =⇒ x ∈ N
so
∀x(x ∈ ∪N→ x ∈ N)
therefore
∪N ⊆ N
Considering above two cases we obtain
(2.10) ∪ N = N.
Considering theorem 2.5 z is the greatest element of N and Eq. (2.10), we have
x ∈ z =⇒ x ∈ z ∧ z ∈ N =⇒ x ∈ ∪N =⇒ x ∈ N
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so
∀x(x ∈ z → x ∈ N)
and
z ⊆ N
On the other hand
x ∈ N =⇒ x ∈ ∪N =⇒ ∃y(y ∈ N ∧ x ∈ y ∧ y ≤ z)
=⇒ ∃y(y ∈ N ∧ x ∈ y ∧ y ⊆ z) =⇒ x ∈ z
so
∀x(x ∈ N→ x ∈ z)
and
N ⊆ z
Considering above two cases we obtain
z = N
and
(2.11) N ∈ N.
However, the conclusion of formula (2.11) that N is the greatest element of itself not
only conflicts with the common sense that there is no greatest natural number, but more
severely it contradicts the axiom of regularity which asserts a set cannot be a member
of itself [1]. And the latter is a serious conflict, because it leads to conflict between the
two axioms of set theory.
3 Discussion
The most important part of this paper is the proof of the property 3 of lemma 2.4 with
which some people may disagree. The most common argument against it is based on the
theory of limit ordinals. They argue that from the formula ∀α(α < λ → Bα+1 6= φ) we
cannot deduce Bλ 6= φ when ordinal λ is a limit ordinal. They maintain, on the contrary,
actually Bλ = φ and λ = ω where ω is the first transfinite limit number.
However, there is some difficulty in this argument neglected by the defenders of set
theory. That is if λ is a limit ordinal the proposition that the iterative process cannot
deduct all the elements of N before step λ is ambiguous in the logic system of set theory.
On the one hand, based on definition 2.3 we know the expression that the iterative process
cannot deduct all the elements of N refers to that the iterative process cannot deduct
all the elements N by every ordinal step. As a result, the proposition that the iterative
process cannot deduct all the elements of N before step λ, a restriction version of above
expression with a restriction to limit its concerning domain to the steps only before step
λ (it does not care about whether the iterative process can deduct all the elements by
or after step λ for it does not mention this in the statement, and it just care about the
results of the steps before λ, so whether or not the proposition is true is only decided
by the results of the steps before λ), should, as its literal meaning, be interpreted as the
iterative process cannot deduct all the elements of N by every step before λ. Then the
interpretation can be written as ∀α(α < λ → Bα+1 6= φ). This interpretation expresses
the original meaning of the proposition. On the other hand, according to the explanation
of definition 2.1 we know Bλ is the particular remaining part of N exactly before step λ is
performed. So the proposition is also logically interpreted as Bλ 6= φ (the remaining part
is still not empty before step λ is performed). The second interpretation expresses the
extended meaning of the proposition based on, Bλ, the critical result of exactly before
step λ. As both interpretations are correct in semantics they should be equivalent in logic.
And for most instances, i.e. if λ is a successor ordinal the two forms of interpretation are
equal indeed so they do not cause any logic problem. But if λ is a limit ordinal, the two
formulas, ∀α(α < λ → Bα+1 6= φ) and Bλ 6= φ, are not equal within the framework of
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set theory, so the proposition is ambiguous in the logic system which contains set theory.
And this ambiguity will jeopardize the rigorousness and consistency of the logical system
and will lead to contradiction when considering the question of whether the iterative
process can deduct all the elements of N before step λ with the assumption Bλ = φ.
Therefore even λ is a limit ordinal does not solve all the problems.
Further analysis at the level of general logic reveals that the notion of transfinite
limit ordinal is the source of all difficulties. In set theory formula ∀x ∈ C(F (x)) means
every element of class C has the property F . So we can check some elements of C, and if
we have already checked that all the elements of C have the property F we will be fully
convinced that the formula is true. If C is a finite class the verification of the formula
must be conducted in this complete way since having all the elements of C checked is
possible. But if C is not a finite class, the situation is quite different. In this case we
are not sure whether having all the elements of C checked is possible in principle for it
involves whether an infinite process of checking can complete (from the point of view
of potential infinity, an infinite process cannot complete, but in the light of set theory
some infinite processes do can complete which is analyzed in the following section of
this paragraph). So the safe scheme to this situation should be that if having all the
elements of C checked is possible we should check all the elements before coming to
the conclusion that the formula is true and if it is no possible we need not complete
the check of all elements and we just need check every single element to ensure it has
the property F (obviously, under such circumstance, the check process cannot complete
otherwise having all the elements checked is possible). So having every single element
checked is possible does not mean having all elements checked is possible, and we call the
former a weak check and the latter a strong check. A weak check just means a infinite
process of checking but does not guarantee the process can complete. If a weak check
cannot complete indeed the strong check is impossible and also does not exist. If a weak
check can complete it turns out to be a strong check. With these notions we come to an
important conclusion that if class C is the ordinal number λ, the formula ∀α ∈ λ(F (α))
must be verified with a strong check. Heuristically, an iterative process can be used to
check whether every element α of λ has the property F (α), i.e. at step 0 it checks F (0),
at step 1 it checks F (1) and so on. So exactly before step λ it has already checked all
the elements in λ that indicates the the check process has completed before step λ. As a
result, the infinite check process does can complete if C is an ordinal. Another important
and interesting conclusion is that if C is a proper class the formula ∀α ∈ C(F (α)) must
be checked with a weak check. In that case C is too big to have any definite cardinality
so it is not possible to complete the check of all elements of C within any ordinal step
(within any ordinal step we just can check a portion of C with a definite cardinality, in
set theory the checked portion is called a subset of C, but we never can obtain a checked
portion that exactly covers the whole domain of C which is too big to be covered by
any static completed entity, i.e. any set). Therefore, for a proper class, a strong check is
impossible and the infinite check process is incompletable in essence. If C is the proper
class On, we usually use transfinite induction to prove or check formula ∀α ∈ On(F (α)).
That is if F (0) holds and ∀β < α(F (β)) → F (α) holds then ∀α ∈ On(F (α)) holds.
Under such checking scheme, it is obvious that there is no ordinal number in On which
is not checked by the transfinite induction. But from this we should not go too far to
infer that the transfinite induction has already checked all the ordinal numbers in On
that contradicts above second conclusion that the infinite check process of a proper class
is incompletable. So we are in a nuanced situation which suggests the law of excluded
middle is not applicable to proper class and the two facts (having all ordinal numbers in
On checked is impossible and there is no ordinal number in On that is not checked yet)
must both hold. This argument also explains some intuitionists’ concern about the abuse
of the law of excluded middle to infinite set. To be exact, here it should be proper class
rather than infinite set. And the secret to the question lies in the fact that a proper class
is not a completed entity so it is not possible to complete the check of all its elements
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although the check of any element in it is completable.
As λ is an ordinal number, it is the exact set of all the steps before λ. In the light of
the implementation of an iterative checking process, every step α in λ can be checked,
and exactly checking step α means step α and all steps before it are checked but steps
after step α are not checked yet. If λ is a transfinite limit ordinal, it has the property
∀α ∈ λ(α+1 ∈ λ) which means every step α in λ is not the end step in λ. As a result, the
infinite check process of all the steps in λ also does not have an end step. And the essence
of limit ordinal theory lies in it tries to make us believe that a check process without an
end step can end. Integrating with the implementation of an iterative checking process,
the formula can be given further interpretation. It means for every step α in λ when it
has been checked the event that all and only all steps in λ are checked does not happen
for step α+ 1 is in λ and not checked yet. So the critical event does not happen at any
step before step λ. But, on the other hand, with the checking regulation we know at step
λ it begins to check step λ that implies all steps in λ are already checked before step λ is
checked, so the critical event does happen before step λ. Therefore, in the context of set
theory, we have to draw a peculiar conclusion that although the critical event does not
happen at any step before step λ it does happen before step λ. And we are extremely
curious about why mathematicians can not find any logical flaw in the conclusion. If
the conclusion holds there must be a mystery state which is exactly before step λ but
after all steps in λ and the critical event, therefore, does happen at such mystery state.
Unfortunately in the context of set theory there is no such state for the limit ordinal
number λ does not have an immediate predecessor. So the notion of transfinite limit
ordinal is illogical and it is not a proper solution to the problem.
Form above discussion and the derivation of formula (2.11) we know that if we insist
on N is a set we must be confronted with either a contradiction or a conflict with the
axiom of regularity. Both of them are deadly to set theory.
And here we cannot solve the problem by sacrificing the axiom of regularity. If we
do so, Eq. (2.1) should be revised as following completed form to satisfy formula (2.11)
regardless of the violation of regularity
(3.1) N = {0, 1, 2, · · · ,N}.
This form of definition of N, however, is impredicative [2] and contains a vicious circle
[3], from which we even cannot determine the exact value of N since N appears in both
sides of the definition. And what is more, without regularity we even cannot prevent
Mirimanoff’s paradox [4]. Therefore this scheme is totally unacceptable, and the axiom
of infinity should be excluded from set theory to keep the theory consistent.
Since the class of all natural numbers defined by the comprehension principle in Eq.
(2.2) cannot be a set, in the light of NBG set theory [5], it should be a proper class.
The essence of N is its incompleteness and non-substantiality. In other words N is too
large to be any completed entity, and it just can be a dynamic class which is always
under construction. Weyl had obviously seen the difference between completed entity
and dynamic class, and deemed that blindly converting one into the other is the true
source of our difficulties and antinomies, a source more fundamental than Russell’s vicious
circle principle indicated [6]. Our work has made it clear that the dynamic class N cannot
be a set for its incompleteness, and also discloses the essential difference between set and
proper class that is obscure in set theory.
If we do not regard N as a set but a proper class all the difficulties we encounter in
this paper will be resolved. That is if N is not a set we cannot prove B and A are sets.
So there is no the conclusion that A is an initial segment of ordinal and also there is no
the ordinal number λ. Consequently we cannot obtain the property 3 of lemma 2.4; as
a result, the proofs of theorem 2.5 and 2.6 are groundless. And the first contradiction is
also dismissed in the absence of the ordinal number λ.
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4 Conclusion
The difficulties reveal that the axiom of infinity which guarantees the existence of the set
of natural numbers causes either a contradiction or a conflict with the axiom of regularity,
and the essence of the contradiction lies in the inductive definition of set N. When we
define the inductive collection {0, 1, 2, · · · } produced by the inductive add-one process
is an infinite set N, we have already regarded it as a completed, static entity. But on
the other hand, with regularity and the induction principle, the inductive construction
of natural numbers still can step into the next step wherever it attains and produces a
new natural number. So the completed state of the inductive construction does not exist
that implies the infinite set N also does not have a completed form. How can an already
existing entity possess the attribute that it does not have a completed form at the same
time? This is the insidious logical fallacy deeply hiding behind the axiom of infinity.
In our point of view the inductive definition of natural numbers just could guarantee
the existence of an infinite process, but it should not become the sufficient condition for
that the infinite process can be finally done and thus produce an infinite static totality,
i.e., an infinite set. That is the misapprehension of infinity in the notion of actual infinity.
Since we have proved that the class of all natural numbers cannot be a set, the
assertion made in the axiom of infinity that there is an inductive set is improper.
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